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The  paper  will  examine  the  1994  and  2001  Turkish  currency  crises  by  using  early 
warning  system  which  is  based  on  the  “signal”  approach  proposed  by  Kaminsky, 
Lizondo  and  Reinhart  (KLR)  (1998).    The  “signal”  approach  is  a  non-parametric 
approach.    In  this  approach,  the  behavior  of  a  number  of  individual  variables  is 
monitored and they are evaluated against a certain threshold levels.  If any of these 
indicator exceeds its threshold, it is said that indicator issues a “signal” that a currency 
crisis may occur within a given period.   
The objectives of this paper are two folds: to investigate causes of currency crises under 
consideration and to compare similarities and differences of the 1994 and 2001 currency 
crises.  The data consist of monthly data and range from January 1987 to November 
2005 for the following variables: reserves, inflation rate, GDP growth, portfolio capital 
inflow to reserves, short term external debt to reserves, domestic debt, money supply to 
reserves,  current  account  to  GDP,  real  exchange  rate  overvaluation,  regional  stock 
market return, regional market pressure index, stock market index, export and import. 
Results showed that 2001 crisis is deeper and costlier than 1994 crisis, external factors 
play more imported role in 2001 crisis than 1994 crisis and in both crises Weighted 
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Introduction 
Turkey experiences two major currency crises in the post stabilization and liberalization 
period. After the April 1994 currency crisis, the Turkish economy once again found 
itself more severe and persistent currency crises in February 2001.  The effect of the 
1994 and 2001 currency crises on the Turkish economy were extremely costly.  In 1994 
and  2001,  GDP  (unemployment)  decreased  (increased)  4  %  (7%)  and  9  %  (12%), 
respectively
1.   
Even though there are a great deal of studies related to the 1994 and 2001 Turkish 
currency  crises,  most  of  them  investigate  each  crises  separately
2.    Therefore,  those 
studies can not reach a general conclusion about causes of the 1994 and 2001 currency 
crises and can not compare the similarities and the differences of the 1994 and 2001 
currency crises.  To fill up this gap, it is worth to study the causes of the 1994 and 2001 
currency crises and try to show similarities and differences of both currency crises.   
The  paper  will  examine  the  1994  and  2001  currency  crises  by  using  early  warning 
system which is based on the “signal” approach proposed by Kaminsky, Lizondo and 
Reinhart (1998).  The “signal” approach is a non-parametric approach.  In this approach, 
the behavior of a number of individual variables is monitored and they are evaluated 
against a certain threshold levels.  If any of these indicator exceeds its threshold, it is 
said that indicator issues a “signal” that a currency crisis may occur within a given 
period. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide a brief literature review 
about financial crises models. In section 3, we introduce “signal approach”, data and 
variables.  In section 4, we represent our results from “signal approach” model. Section 
5 is conclusion. 
Financial Crises Models  
There  are  mainly  two  approaches  in  the  literature  to  explain  the  determinants  of 
currency crises.  The first-generation model was developed by Krugman (1979) and 
extended  by  Flood  and  Garber  (1984)  in  response  to  currency  crises  in  developing 
countries  in  the  1980s.    According  to  the  first-generation  currency  crises  model, 
expansionary  fiscal  and  monetary  policies  are  inconsistent  with  fixed  exchange  rate 
policies.  When the fiscal deficit is financed by expansion of domestic credit, reserves 
decrease to defend the fixed exchange rate and significant loss of reserves forces the 
authorities either to devalue or float the domestic currency. 
Second-generation models are due to Obstfeld (1986) and later extended by him (1994, 
1996) to respond to currency crises when the fundamentals of an economy were sound, 
as in the 1990s.  According to second-generation models, changes in the government’s 
objective function change agents’ expectation and trigger currency crises.  In Obstfeld’s 
(1994, 1996) model, the government favors lower unemployment and higher output: 
hence  when  the  costs  of  defending  the  peg  (such  as  higher  interest  rates,  higher 
unemployment, lower growth) are more than the benefit of defending the peg (such as 
                                                 
1 T.C.M.B. 
2 Yeni Türkiye Dergisi (2001), Kriz özel sayısı 41 and Ekonomik Kriz Oncesi Erken Uyari Sistemleri 
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gaining credibility and lower inflation) the government devalues even if macroeconomic 
fundamentals such as foreign debt, budget deficit, reserves etc are sound. 
There are mainly two alternative methods to predict to currency crises.  First one is 
limited  dependent  variables  estimation  which  using  logit  or  probit  model  to  predict 
financial crises.  Due to the failure of the limited dependent variables estimation method 
to predict the currency crisis, Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (KLR) came out a new 
approach in 1998, which is called “Signal Approach”.  In signal approach, each variable 
are monitored separately from each other and the deviation of the variable exceeds a 
certain “threshold” value before crises give us an early warning signal about a possible 
currency crisis within a specific period of time.  
Signal approach has some advantages. First, if variables have sharp changes between 
crisis  and  tranquility  periods,  signal  approach  may  predict  crises  better.  Second, 
indicators can be ranked according to noise-to signal ratio, which ability of indicator to 
predict crises and avoid false signals.  
KLR (1998) surveyed a large number of empirical studies to identify the most important 
indicators. Their survey covered 76 currency crises and included 15 developing and 5 
developed countries during 1970-1995. Out of more than 100 indicators, they founded 
following (real exchange rate, real interest rate, imports, M2 multiplier, output, bank 
deposits, “excess” M1 balances, exports, terms of trade, international reserves, stock 
prices, real interest rate differential, M2/international reserves, lending rate/deposit rate 
and domestic credit/GDP) 15 indicators most important.  In their empirical work for 
signal approach, they found that the best indicators of currency crises based on noise-to 
signal ratios are real exchange rate, export, stock prices and M2/ international reserves. 
Ucer, Van Rijckeghem and Yolalan (1998) applied KLR’s signal approach in to the 
April 1994 Turkish currency crisis. In their empirical work, first, they duplicated KLR’s 
work  for  Turkey  during  the  fourth  quarter  of  1989  to  fourth  quarter  of  1997,  with 
exception  of  the  real  interest  rate  differential,  lending  rate/deposit  rate  and  bank 
deposits. Second, they examined seven additional variables (export/import, short-term 
advances to the treasury/GDP, short-term external debt/GNP, (reserves/M2Y), domestic 
government debt stock, domestic government debt maturity, government deficit/GDP 
and  short-term  advances  to  the  treasury/GDP).  In  their  finding,  KLR  variables 
performed very poor to predict the 1994 Turkish crisis. Out of the 12 KLR variables 
only  excess  M1  variables  signaled  two  times,  export,  M2/reserves  and  stock  prices 
variables signaled one time and seven variables did not signal.  Additional variables 
performed well compared to KLR variables. Export/import, (reserves/M2Y),domestic 
government debt stock and short-term advances to the treasury/GDP variables signaled 
two  times,  short-term  advances  to  the  treasury/GDP  variable  signaled  one  time  and 
short-term external debt/GNP signaled three times. 
Studies related to 1994 and 2001 Turkish currency crises showed that exchange rate 
overvaluation,  current  account  deficit,  capital  outflow,  increase  in  external  debt  and 
money supply were main indicators of currency crises
3. 
                                                 
3 C. Gerni, Ö. S. Emsen, M. K. Değer (2006), M. Alagöz, N. I ık, G. Delice (2006), M. Doğanlar (2006), 
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Signal Approach 
In this study, we uses the “signal” approach model proposed by KLR (1998) to compare 
similarities and differences of the 1994 and 2001 currency crises.  
Signaling Horizon and Threshold Level 
To make the signal approach model operational we need to define a signaling horizon 
and a threshold level.  The signaling horizon or crises window can be defined as the 
period within or time interval over which crises would be anticipated by indicators. We 
use 12 months crises window for currency crises.  The threshold level is chosen to 
minimize the “noise-to-signal” (bad signal to good signal) ratio. We will use following 
matrix to measure the “noise to signal” ratios for each indicators.  
  Currency Crisis   No Currency Crisis  
Indicator issues a signal  A   B  
Indicator does not issue a signal  C   D  
* 12 months window was selected. 
Where  A(t)  is  the  number  of  instances  in  which  a  indicator  issues  a  signal  and  a 
currency crisis occurred in the next 12 months (i.e. A(t) is the number of the time the 
indicator provides “good signal” about the occurrences of currency crisis).  B(t) is the 
number of instances in which a indicator issues a signal and a currency crisis did not 
occurred in the next 12 months (i.e. B(t) is the number of the time the indicator provides 
“bad signal” or “noise” about the occurrence of currency crises in the next 12 months ).  
C(t) is the number of instances in which a indicator did not issues a signal in the next 12 
months when there was a currency crisis in the next 12 months (i.e. C(t) is the number 
of the time the indicator did not provide a good signal about the occurrence of currency 
crises in the next 12 months ).  D (t) is the number of instances in which a indicator did 
not issues a signal in the next 12 months when there was  no currency crisis  in the next 
12 months (i.e. D(t) is the number of the time in which neither indicator issue a signal 
and crises occurred in the next 12 months).  It is obvious from above matrix that the 
perfect predictor will produce only observations A and D.   
Data Sample 
The data consist of monthly data and range from January 1987 to November 2005.  
Most  of  the  data  are  from  the  International  Financial  Statistics  CD-ROM  database.  
International  Financial  Corporation’s  Emerging  Market  Dataset  and  Morgan  Stanley 
Countries Index provide stock market indexes.  Table 1 shows selected variables and 
references for expected signs.   
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Table 1: Selected variables and expected signs 
Explanatory Variables  Expected Sign  References 
Stock market index  _  Kaminksy,  Lizondo  and  Reinhart 
(1998), Kaminksy and Reinhart (1999) 
Return  of  regional  stock  market 
index (RSMI) 
-  Bilson, Brailsford and Hooper (2001) 
Inflation rate  +  Fama  (1981),  Geske  and  Roll  (1983), 
Stulz (1986) 
GDP  -  Kaminksy,  Lizondo  and  Reinhart 
(1998), Kaminksy and Reinhart (1999) 
Reserves  -  Kaminksy,  Lizondo  and  Reinhart 
(1998), Kaminksy and Reinhart (1999) 
Portfolio capital inflow/Reserves  -  Bond (1999) 
Export  -  Kaminksy,  Lizondo  and  Reinhart 
(1998), Kaminksy and Reinhart (1999) 
Import  +  Kaminksy,  Lizondo  and  Reinhart 
(1998), Kaminksy and Reinhart (1999) 
Real exchange rate   +  Frankel and Rose (1996) 
Short term external debt / reserves  +  Sachs and Radelet (1998) 
Short  term  domestic  debt  / 
reserves 
+  Ucer and Yeldan (1998) 
Ratio of money supply to reserves  +  Calvo and Mendoza (1996), Frankel and 
Rose (1996) 
Ratio  of  current  account  to  real 
GDP 
-  Kaminksy and Reinhart (1999) 
Regional  market  pressure  index 
variable (RMPI) 
+  Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996), 
Fratzscher (2002) 
Regional  Stock  Market  Index  provided  by  International  Financial  Corporation’s 
Emerging  Market  Dataset  and  Morgan  Stanley  Countries  Index.    Regional  Market 
Pressure Index constructed individual countries market pressure index.  The regional 
market pressure index for Turkey is the average of Greece, Russia, Germany, England, 
France, Italy and Spai’s market pressure index.  
Results from Signal Approach 
Results based on signal approach represented table 2 and 3.  By using those two tables 
we can see the similarities and the differences of the 1994 and 2001 currency crises.  
Table 2 reports performances of selected crises indicators for 1994 and 2001 crises.  
The first two columns show the number of times a signal was issued in the 12 months 
window  preceding  the  indicated  crises.    The  last  two  columns  give  aggregate 
information about the threshold level and noise-to-signal ratio.  Based on the noise-to-
signal  ratio  except  inflation  all  variables  appear  useful  because  their  noise-to-signal 
ratio is less than one. Lower noise-to-signal ratio is preferred.  From table 2, we can 
reach following conclusions.  All of the crises indicators (except inflation for 2001) 
issued at least one signal prior to 1994 and 2001 crises.  Prior to 1994 (2001) crises International Conference on Emerging Economic Issues in a Globalizing World, Đzmir, 2008 
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selected variables issued 27 (30) signals.  Out of 14 variables import variable signaled 
seven  times,  reserves  variable  signaled  three  times  and  reel  exchange  rate,  export, 
CA/GDP, inflation and  GDP variables signaled two times prior to 1994 currency crises. 
Out of 14 variables import and CA/GDP variables signaled six times, RSMI variable 
signaled three times and portfolioInv./reserves, domestic debt, external debt, RMPI and  
GDP  variables  signaled  two  times  prior  to  2001  currency  crises.    Regional  market 
pressure  index,  regional  stock  market  index,  CA  /  GDP,  PortfolioInv/Reserves  and 
external debt variables issued six signals prior to 1994 currency crisis and fifteen signals 
prior to 2001 currency crisis.  Therefore, we can say that external factors play more 
imported role in 2001 crisis than 1994 crisis. 
Table 3 evaluates overall performance of crises indicators 12 months prior to crises.  
The first two columns show the number of indicators and number of signal issued in 
monthly base prior currency crises.  The last column shows Weighted Composite Index 
(I)
4.  Weighted Composite Index is total number of signal divided by noise-to signal 
ratio and gives aggregate information about the likelihood of upcoming crises.    
Table 2: Overall Performance of Selected Variables 
 
Number of Signals in 
Preceding 
12 Months 












Reserves  3  1  -10  0.18 
Real Exchange 
Rate  2  1  +10  0.48 
Stock Market 
Index  1  1  -18  0.57 
Export  2  1  -10  0.86 
Import  7  6  +40  0.76 
Portfolio 
Inv./Reserves  1  2  -10  0.81 
Domestic Debt  1  2  +12  0.48 
External Debt  1  2  +15  0.54 
M2/Reserves  1  1  +9  0.63 
CA / GDP  2  6  -6  0.49 
RMPI  1  2  -0.45  0.94 
Inflation  2  0  +5  1.9 
RSMI  1  3  -7  0.87 
GDP  2  2  -6  0.71 
         
         
         
                                                 
4          n 
   It = Σ Sjt / Wj     where Sjt is 1 if variables j issued a signal in period t, 0 otherwise and  Wj is the  
             j=1 
     adjusted noise-to signal ratio of each variable j. International Conference on Emerging Economic Issues in a Globalizing World, Đzmir, 2008 
 
  252 
Table 3: Selected Variables Performance Monthly Base 
 
Summary of Prediction :  1994 Crisis 
 























1993  14  1  5.55  Feb-
2000  14  1  2.04 
Mar-
1993  14  2  3.67  Mar-
2000  14  1  2.04 
Apr-
1993  14  3  5.44  Apr-
2000  14  2  4.05 
May-
1993  14  1  1.31  May-
2000  14  2  3.35 
Jun-
1993  14  4  8.13  Jun-
2000  14  2  3.50 
Jul-
1993  14  1  1.31  Jul-2000  14  1  1.31 
Aug-
1993  14  3  4.56  Aug-
2000  14  2  2.47 
Sep-
1993  14    0.01  Sep-
2000  14    0.01 
Oct-
1993  14  2  2.55  Oct-
2000  14  4  5.95 
Nov-
1993  14  2  2.46  Nov-
2000  14  5  11.35 
Dec-
1993  14  2  1.84  Dec-
2000  14  3  4.98 
Jan-
1994  14  3  7.49  Jan-
2001  14  4  7.34 
Feb-
1994  14  2  3.60  Feb-
2001  14  3  7.85 
Weighted  Composite  Index  increases  prior  to  both  crises.  Specially,  started  from 
October Weighted Composite Index higher prior to 2001 crisis than prior to 1994 crisis.  
Therefore, we can say that 2001 crisis is more predictable than 1994 crisis. 
Table 4 shows the cost of 1994 and 2001 crises.  We used three crises indicator to 
evaluate the cost of currency crises.  For each indicator, we identified maximum level 
prior the crisis, minimum level, and recovery period.   In 1994 currency crisis, reserves 
reached maximum level (17.8 Billion $) at October 1993 then reached minimum level 
(12.4 Billion) at May 1993 (9 months period).  Finally, reserves recovery at January 
1995.  Recovery of reserves took 27 months.  In 2001 currency crisis, reserves reached 
maximum level (36 Billion $) at July 2000 then reached minimum level (28 Billion) at 
November  2001  (11  months  period).    Finally,  reserves  recovery  at  October  2002.  
Recovery of reserves took 28 months.  Recovery of SMI in 1994 (2001) crisis took 7 
months (44 months).  Recovery of industrial production in 1994 (2001) crisis took 19 
months (34 months).   International Conference on Emerging Economic Issues in a Globalizing World, Đzmir, 2008 
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We can concluded from table 4 that 2001 crisis is deeper and costlier than 1994 crisis.   
Table 4: Cost of Currency Crises 
Cost of 1994 Crisis 
Indicators  Maximum  Minimum  Recovery     
Reserves  Oct.  93=17.8 
B. 
May  94= 
12.4 B. 
Jan.  95=18.2 
B. 
9 months  27 months 
SMI  Jan. 94=241  March 
94=145 
Aug 94=245  5 months  7 months 
Industrial. 
Production 
Dec. 93=86  June 94= 68  July 95=88  13 
months 
19 months 
Cost of 2001 Crisis 
Indicators  Maximum  Minimum  Recovery     
Reserves  July  2000=36 
B. 
Nov 01= 28.  Oct. 02=36 B.  11 
months 
28 months 













In this study, we used signal approach to identify which variables tent to indicate that a 
country might be vulnerable to a financial crisis.  Even if it is generally accepted that 
currency crises are unpredictable the results from table 2 show that all of the crises 
indicators (except inflation for 2001) issued at least one signal prior to 1994 and 2001 
crises.  Also, table 3 shows that in both crises Weighted Composite Index increases 
sharply.  Specially, started from October Weighted Composite Index higher prior to 
2001 crisis than prior to 1994 crisis.  Therefore, we can conclude that both crises are 
predictable but 2001 crisis is more predictable than 1994 crisis. 
External variables issued six signals prior to 1994 currency crisis and fifteen signals 
prior to 2001 currency crisis.  Therefore, we can conclude that external factors play 
more imported role in 2001 crisis than 1994 crisis.  Finally, the result from table 4 
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